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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Private Education-Racially Discriminatory Admissions Policies Violate Right to
Contract Provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiffs, ' blacks who had been denied admission 2 solely on the
basis of their race 3 to two all-white private schools that received no
state aid,' sought damages and injunctive relief in federal district
court contending that these rejections violated section 1981 of 42
U.S.C. by denying them the same right to contract as enjoyed by
white citizens. Arguing that private discrimination is an exercise of
freedom of association protected by the first amendment, defendants' insisted that section 1981 could not reach the purely private
discrimination evidenced by the schools' racially motivated admissions policies. In the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, held, judgment' for plaintiffs. A private school's
1. In the first action of the 2 consolidated here, Colin Gonzales sued Fairfax-Brewster
(in his behalf. In the second, Gonzales joined Michael McCrary and McCrary's parents in
their suit against Bobbe's School.
2. Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales, black parents of Colin, submitted an application to FairfaxBrewster School for their son's admission to the school-operated day camp. The application
was rejected, and upon further inquiry, the Gonzales were informed that the school was not
integrated. Later, Mr. Gonzales phoned Bobbe's School and was told that admission was
limited to whites. Mrs. McCrary, black parent of Michael, called Bobbe's School with the
intent of enrolling her son in the school's nursery program, but she was informed that the
school accepted no black children.
3. Although both schools denied that refusal was solely because plaintiffs were black,
the court made a contrary finding of fact.
4. Neither Fairfax-Brewster nor Bobbe's School receives any assistance, financial or
otherwise, from any federal, state, or local agency. Both rely solely on funds derived from
tuition to finance their operations.
5. This section provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
6. Asserting that it represented "non-profit, private white schools in seven states and
the class of all similarly situated schools and their associated students and parents," the
Southern Independent School Association as intervenor-defendant joined Bobbe's School in
this suit. While Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's contended they did not discriminate on the
basis of race, intervenor-defendant conceded that race was a factor in its policies of exclusiveness but challenged the use of § 1981 to force alteration of such admission policies.
7. The court granted a permanent injunction against defendants and intervenor-
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refusal to admit black applicants solely on the basis of race violates
the right to contract guaranteed non-white minorities by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp.
1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
In an attempt to guarantee blacks equal rights following the
Civil War, 8 Congress, pursuant to the thirteenth amendment,9 enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.10 That act served as the source
for sections 198111 and 198212 of 42 U.S.C.-statutes that were potential vehicles for judicial protection of black citizens' freedom from
both public and private discrimination.'3 But in the Civil Rights
Cases' 4-an early landmark analysis of the thirteenth amendment
and the accompanying enforcement legislation-the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a prohibition of purely private discrimination
in this statutory scheme. In 1906 the narrow holding of Hodges v.
United States'5 reinforced this analysis when the Court limited both
the thirteenth amendment and section 1981 to acts of actual endefendant prohibiting them from discriminating solely on the basis of race. The court also
awarded plaintiffs compensatory damages and attorney's fees.
8. Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination:An Historical Justification for a
JudicialTrend, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1024, 1025-29 (1972).
9. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
10. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
11. Although § 1981 was traced to the fourteenth amendment in Cook v. Advertiser
Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rather than the thirteenth amendment and the 1866
Act, the Supreme Court has held that § 1981 has the same origin as § 1982 in the 1866 Act.
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). For a discussion of the
disputed common origin of the 2 sections see Note, supra note 8, at 1036.
12. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
13. The comprehensive language of the original § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 read
as follows:
[Clitizens, of every race and color, ...
shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, . . . as is enjoyed by wliite citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of April 9, 1866, § 1, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating §§ l and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as unconstitutional).
15. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
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slavement. 16 More than half a century later, however, in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,"r the Supreme Court overruled Hodges" and
held that the thirteenth amendment empowers Congress to determine what types of discrimination constitute "badges and incidents
of slavery" and to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing
such discrimination. 9 Examining the debates z° surrounding passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,21 the Jones majority2 concluded that
section one, the precursor of section 1982 of 42 U.S.C., intended
prohibition of all racially motivated deprivations, whether by individuals or by state action, of the right to acquire both real and
personal property. Although the Jones reasoning applied directly
only to section 1982, a footnote to the opinion linked section 1981
to the analysis. 23 Relying on the Jones rationale, the Supreme Court
subsequently clarified the purview of section 1982 in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park4 by implying a "truly private" exception if a
plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race could be shown.
Deciding that a community corporation organized to operate a
neighborhood pool did not qualify as "truly private" since every
white within the geographical area could belong, 2 the Court concluded that the corporation's racially discriminatory membership
policies violated property rights guaranteed by section 1982. Most
recently, in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,2 8 a case
factually similar 27 to Sullivan, the Supreme Court finally had occasion to consider section 1981 directly. 2 Observing that the operative
16. Although the Court recognized that the thirteenth amendment prohibits involuntary servitude and that every wrong done to an individual operates to abridge some right, it
insisted that no personal acts of discrimination operate to reduce one to a condition of slavery.
Id. at 17-18.
17. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
18. Id. at 441-43 n.78.
19. Id. at 440.

20. See CONG.

GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).

21. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
22. In a vigorous dissent, Justices Harlan and White stated that the majority opinion's
construction of § 1982 as applying to purely private action was "at the least . . . open to
serious doubt." 392 U.S. 409, 450 (1968). For an argument in support of the dissent's position,
see Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: JudicialActivism Run Riot, 22 VAD. L. Rlv. 485
(1969).
23. 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968).
24. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
25. Id. at 236.
26. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
27. This case also involved discriminatory membership policies of a neighborhood corporation operating a community swimming pool, but in addition, this case involved denial
of admission to a black guest.
28. The court considered the § 1981 claim that was based upon the refusal of admission
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language of both sections 1982 and 1981 was traceable to section one
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,2' the Court could see no reason to
construe section 1981 any differently from section 1982.30 By directly
holding that section 1981 equally is applicable to private discrimination, the Court affirmed the majority view of the federal judiciary:" that has evolved in the wake of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
Although most of the lower court decisions considering section 1981
have been limited to disallowing the abrogation of contract rights
via employment discrimination, 32 Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc.33
applied section 1981 to discriminatory admissions practices. In that
case, the court found that the racially restricted admissions policy
of a professional barber school violated section 1981 by denying
black applicants the same right to contract for training that white
applicants possessed.3 1 While use of section 1981 to reach discrimination in private non-professional education had been predicted in
legal literature, 31 the courts had continued to use a more traditional
judicial assault based on the reasoning of Brown v. Board of
of a member's black guest in the concluding section of its opinion. Although consideration
was very brief, it was direct and not relegated to a footnote.
29. See note 13 supra.
30. 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973).
31. Young v. International Tel. & Tel., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
911 (1970); Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Grier
v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971); United States v. Medical Soc'y
of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969). Contra, Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212
(M.D. Ala. 1971), af'd on othergrounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Culpepper v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th
Cir. 1970).
32. See, e.g., Young v. International Tel. & Tel., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). The
following cases, however, concerned contractual arrangements in a nonemployment context:
Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (black refused the
right to purchase a ticket for entrance to a recreation area because of her race); Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afl'd on other grounds, 4.58 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1972) (newspaper's refusal to print Negro wedding announcements in its regular
society pages); Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (black
plaintiffs refused admission to barber training program); United States v. Medical Soc'y of
S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969) (suit to enjoin discriminatory admission practices of
defendant hospital).
33. 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
34. Id. at 860.
35. In an examination of the implications of Jones, a legal scholar suggested that in the
desegregation of private schools, the state action controversy could be over-leapt by invoking
§ 1981; he reasoned that a black applying for admission to a private school is, in effect, asking
to make a contract with that institution to purchase its educational services. Larson, The
New Law of Race Relations, 69 Wis. L. REv. 470, 502 (1969).
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Education,"and the state involvement prohibition found in the fourteenth amendment. Thus, even though the courts have enjoined a
variety of state programs assisting racially restricted private academies 3 7 they have consistently permitted the private discrimination
39 a recent case invalidating
itself.3 N Indeed, in Norwood v. Harrison,
a state statute authorizing state-furnished, free textbooks to private
as well as public schools,'" the Supreme Court noted that the
schools' private bias was not barred by the Constitution nor did it
invoke any sanction of laws."
In the instant case, after a threshold 2 finding that the schools'
admissions practices were racially discriminatory,13 the court analyzed section 1981. By relying upon the reading given section 1982
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and upon the interrelation of sections 1981 and 1982 asserted in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, the court interpreted section 1981 to cover blacks who
have been denied their right to make a contract, including a contract for education, because they are not white. Reasoning that
Congress intended to prohibit private racial discrimination against
blacks to the same degree in section 1981 as in section 1982, the
court concluded that state action is not necessary to invoke the
statute in question. To determine if the schools' actions were nevertheless outside the reach of the statute, the court looked to Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park and ruled that defendants' activities did not
fit the "truly private" exception since no plan or purpose of exclu36.
37.

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
For a discussion of judicial treatment of state assistance ranging from tuition grants

to furnishing free textbooks, see Note, Post-Brown Private White Schools-An Imperfect
Dualism, 26 VAND. L. REV. 587 (1973).
38. Id. at 624.
39. 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973).
40. The Court analogized state textbooks to state tuition grants and concluded that
such state action encourages discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
2809-11.
41. "Such private bias is not barred by the Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction
of laws, but neither can it call on the Constitution for material aid from the State.
[But] some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment ....
Id. at 2812-13.
42. The court ruled at the very outset that the case would not be tried as a class action

by simply stating, "No determination was made prior to trial that the action might be
maintained as a class action . . . . and the Court does not feel it should be so maintained.
Accordingly the decision is only binding on the named plaintiffs, the named defendants and
those schools which actually comprise the intervenor." 363 F. Supp. at 1203.
43. In addition to plaintiffs' allegations, the court relied upon the testimony of a Mrs.
Bryant and a Mr. Brooks who stated that they had made telephone calls to both schools and
were told by school officials that blacks were not accepted.
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siveness other than race had been shown.44 Finally, the court disregarded defendants' reliance on "certain dicta"45 in Norwood v.
Harrisoncharacterizing private discrimination as a protected exercise of the freedom of association. In rejecting defendants' theory,
the court pointed out three significant and determinative features
of Norwood: first, it involved a fourteenth amendment claim, not a
section 1981 claim; secondly, it cited Jones as an example of private
discrimination made unlawful by Congress; thirdly, it specifically
stated that no questions as to the right of citizens to maintain private schools with discriminatory admissions policies were raised.
Accordingly, the court concluded that defendants' refusal to admit
blacks solely on the basis of race unlawfully denied plaintiffs the
right to make contracts guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Even though the court's reasoning was somewhat abbreviated,
the practical and legal implications of the instant decision46 are
considerable. The holding itself will prevent any of the schools represented in the action" from openly continuing to deny admission
to blacks solely on the basis of race and will establish an important
precedent 8 that could be followed in other private education cases.
If eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court, the instant decision
will more quickly destroy the imperfect dualism between public and
private education that has existed since Brown v. Board of
4
Education9.
While critics of the decision might argue that its ulti44. The court also thought it "appropriate" to point out its views on the application of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970), even though no relief was
sought under that statute. Thus, noting that Sullivan had abolished traditional definitional
notions of "private" in cases brought under §§ 1981 and 1982, without expressing its reasons,
the court pointed out that §§ 2000a et seq. did not limit § 1981 and that, consequently, the
private establishments exemption of § 2000a(e) did not apply. Section 2000a(e) provides as

follows: "Private-establishments. The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a
private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that
the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an
establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section."
45. The court classified the following excerpt as dicta: "[Pirivate discrimination may
be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment .

. . ."

Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804, 2813 (1973).

46. Although no appeal has been docketed yet, attorney for defendants has stated that
the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court if necessary. TIME, Aug. 13, 1973, at 49.
47. The Southern Independent School Association comprises 395 schools and 180,000
pupils in 7 southern states. Id.
48. The precedential value of a footnote to the opinion in which the court said that
private schools are "free to discriminate against whites, or against non-whites if whites are
similarly discriminated against, without running afoul of § 1981" is doubtful since the "all
persons" provision of the statute has been read as including whites. See, e.g., Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 899 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
49. Note, supra note 37.
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mate effect will thus be to destroy private white academies, such a
result is unlikely. Private academies are more likely to survive virtually intact by more carefully hiding their racially discriminatory
admissions practices. If the private school couches its admissions
policy in terms of academic, economic, social, or geographical requirements, racially discriminatory practices could be difficult to
prove. Under the holding of the instant case, a future plaintiff would
initially have to show denial of admission solely on the basis of race;
therefore, if the school had already admitted a token black or limited its enrollment to a particular geographical, social, economic, or
academic class to which plaintiff did not belong, the court could
conclude that section 1981 had not been violated. Future decisions
following this holding will consequently turn upon factual determinations by the courts, and each will be correspondingly limited in
its application. Thus the instant decision will mean an increased
work load for the federal courts since this case-by-case method of
policing discrimination in private education will be added to the
burdensome supervisory responsibilities already assumed in public
education. The additional effort in factual analysis created by the
instant holding is counterbalanced, however, by the case's promulgation of a legal principle that is more easily applied than the fourteenth amendment. Courts no longer must search for evidence of
state action or involvement to bring private schools discriminating
solely on the basis of race within the reach of the fourteenth amendment's prohibition. Now a federal statute that has been logically
construed as applying directly to private education may be used to
end such racially restricted admissions policies. Nevertheless, the
instant decision's failure to directly and thoroughly meet the constitutional defense of freedom of association, while simplifying the
application of section 1981, did not finally delineate the statute's
limits. Thus, because the appropriate balance between freedom
from discrimination on the basis of race and freedom of association
is not fixed, a higher court's tilting of the scales could upset the
instant decision on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. In
any event, the instant decision does present the courts with an
opportunity to facilitate the kind of activism on behalf of blacks
that was begun in Jones. The Supreme Court has recently had occasion to voice its disapproval of the racially restricted schools' "educational message" that segregation is desirable in education."0 If the
courts choose to use it, section 1981 could prove an effective means
for silencing that message.
50.

Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804, 2812 (1973).
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Copyright-Telecommunications-CATV Importation of Distant Television Signals Constitutes
Infringement Under Sections One (c) & (d) of the
Copyright Act
Plaintiffs,' creators and producers of television programs,
brought a copyright infringement action against defendants,2 owners and operators of Community Antenna Television (CATV) systems. 3 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' five CATV systems,4 by
intercepting the signals of local 5 and distant' television stations that
were broadcasting plaintiff's copyrighted works and then channel7
ing those programs to defendants' subscribers, had performed
plaintiff's works within the meaning of sections one (c) and (d) of
the Copyright Act of 1909.8 The federal district court, upholding
1. Plaintiffs included Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., Calvada Productions, Jack
Chertok Television, Inc., and Dena Pictures, Inc.
2. Defendants included Teleprompter Corporation and its subsidiary Conley Electronics Corporation.
3. "The terminology used in cable communications borrows needlessly from the nomenclature of broadcasting. 'Community antenna television,' from which the letters 'CATV'
derive, 'cable television,' and 'cablecasting' obviously are adaptations of 'television' and
'broadcasting.' However, electronic cable communications are a complete system of telecommunications, of which broadcasting is a component part. A new terminology should be developed. For example, cable communications systems might better be called 'cable communications (CACOM)."'
Barrow, The New CA TV Rules: Proceed on Delayed Yellow, 25 VAND. L. REv. 681 n.1 (1972).
4. The copyright claims were limited to the operations of Teleprompter's CATV systems in 5 cities at stated periods: Elmira, N.Y. in Nov. 1964; Farmington, N.M. in Nov. 1964,
June 1969, and Mar. 1971; Rawlins, Wyo. in June 1969; Great Falls, Mont. in June 1969; and
New York City in June 1969 and Mar. 1971.
5. Defendants' CATV systems received certain signals from local television stations
through the use of antennas located in or directly adjacent to the communities served by the
CATV systems.
6. Defendants' CATV systems also received and retransmitted signals at points as close
as 43 miles and as far away as 600 miles from the communities served by the CATV systems.
7. Plaintiff also alleged that the following activities gave defendant's CATV systems the
function of performers: (1) program origination, (2) selection of programs, (3) microwave
transmission, (4) interconnection with other CATV stations, (5) advertising, and (6) sale of
commercials. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. 618, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
8. The Copyright Act of 1909 reads in pertinent part:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have
the exclusive right:
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in public
for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other nondramatic
literary work; to make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by
or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited,
delivered, presented, produced, or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for
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defendants' contention that they had not performed the copyrighted
works, dismissed the complaint On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed in part and
reversed and remanded in part. For purposes of copyright liability,
a CATV system that imports distant television signals is functionally a performer of those programs and is liable for infringement
under the Copyright Act. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
CATV, more commonly called cable television, was an invention of the early 1950's"° and was designed originally to provide
better access to television signals in areas where there was no local
station or where local terrain" interfered with off-the-air 12 television
reception. Early CATV systems had up to five channels that received transmitted signals of television stations from as far away as
sixty miles by means of a large, central antenna; 13 these signals were
then refined and strengthened through amplifiers and transmitted
via coaxial cables to television sets of paying subscribers. 4 Because
of numerous technological advancements, modem CATV systems
are very different from the earlier systems. As characterized by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,"
CATV systems now serve two functions: first, they facilitate satisfactory reception of local television signals which are already in a
profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any
method whatsoever.
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be
a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any
record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription or
record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any
method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit,
perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever
17 U.S.C. §§ l(c), (d) (1970).
9. 355 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
10. See Note, Regulation of Community Antenna Television, 70 COLUM. L. Rv. 837
(1970). See also Barrow, supra note 3, at 682. The first use of antenna and cable to capture
and carry signals to subscribers for a fee was in 1923, when radio signals were captured and
delivered in Dundee, Mich. Barnouw, The Image Empire, in 3 A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING
IN THE UNrrED STATES,

247-48 (1970).

11. See Note, supra note 10, at 837-38.
12. The term "off-the-air" is used to indicate the reception of broadcast television
signals by means of an antenna or similar receiving equipment. 476 F.2d at 343 n.5.
13. See Note, supra note 10, at 838.
14. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 n.8 (1968); 37 FoaDHAM
L. REV. 597 n.1 (1969).
15. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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community; and secondly they make possible the reception of distant television signals that must be imported into the community.,'
The latter function is made possible by employing a microwave
relay whereby the intercepted signal is focused and transmitted
through the air in a beam precisely aimed at a receiving antenna
which then channels the signals to the subscribers; 7 this process has
the potential of increasing the reception range of CATV systems to
possible nationwide proportions."5 In addition, the modern systems
have increased channel capacities and can offer a viewer up to
twenty-five channels from which to select. 9 Importation of distant
signals, coupled with the increased channel capacity of CATV, has
prompted CATV operators to introduce many new and innovative
changes, including program origination." Initially, creators and
producers of copyrighted programs welcomed the advent of CATV
because it extended their program's reception into areas where previously there had been only poor reception or none at all. 2' Indeed,
22
they viewed the development of CATV as a key to new markets;
however, when CATV systems began to utilize microwave links to
import distant programs into local communities, their enthusiasm
quickly disappeared. The copyright holders discovered that a
CATV system's importation of programs into its market from a
distant station's market reduced the copyright holders' ability to
license those programs for later presentation in the importing market and diminished the potential audience for those programs if in
fact they were licensed subsequently for exhibition by a local sta16. Id. at 163.
17. 476 F.2d at 343 n.6; Barrow, supra note 3, at 682-83.
18. In the instant case, television programs transmitted from Los Angeles stations were
seen in Farmington, N.M. via a 1300-mile microwave link system. 476 F.2d at 344.
19. Barrow, supra note 3, at 684-85. See also Note, supra note 10, at 840-41: "The
nation's first twenty-four channel system was constructed in Bucks County, Pa., in 1967. A
forty channel system is now under construction in Akron, Ohio. The first section of a fortytwo channel system is ready for operation in San Jose, California. None of these, however,
even approaches the capacities of cable technology which in the present state of the art can
provide a system with up to eighty-two television channels on a single cable." (Footnotes
omitted).
20. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 841.
"At first most origination was limited to providing certain continuous electronic services,
such as stock tickers, A.P. or U.P.I. news tickers, weather information channels, etc." Id.
Today CATV program origination has developed to the point where educational and dramatic
works are shown. 476 F.2d at 344.
21. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Revision of the Copyright Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 8, pt. 2, at 1225 (1965).
22. Id. pt. 3, at 1828.
23. Id., pt. 2, at 1226; 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 597 (1969).
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tion. The net result was a reduction in the price a local station was
willing to pay for the right to broadcast those programs.2 4 The threat
posed by the CATV systems caused copyright holders to look to the
Copyright Act 5 in attempts to prohibit CATV operators from importing copyrighted programs. Sections one (c) and (d) of the Copyright Act relate to televised works and give copyright holders the
exclusive right to perform those works in public for profit. 2 Because
CATV operators charge subscribers a monthly fee, their service is
clearly profit making.27 There is also little doubt that CATV is public for purposes of the Act; in Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American
Automobile Accessories Co. the Sixth Circuit held that a performance is public even though the listeners are unable to communicate
with each other and are able to enjoy the production alone in the
privacy of their homes. 28 The question of whether CATV systems
"perform," however, has not been resolved so easily. In the 1929
decision of Buck v. Debaum,21 a federal district court held that a
cafe owner who received copyrighted musical compositions broadcast via radio and then permitted his customers to listen to the
radio, did not perform the copyrighted works. The court found that
one did not perform within the meaning of the Copyright Act when
he merely facilitated the reception by others of signals already present in the air. 3 Two years later the Supreme Court reached an
opposite result in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 31 when it held
that a hotel did perform by making available to its customers,
through a speaker system, copyrighted works broadcast by a local
radio station. The Court found that one performs when he sets up
elaborate equipment to receive radio signals and makes those signals available to customers.3 2 For the copyright holders, this latter
Buck decision provided a significant precedent with which to attack
CATV operations. When the Supreme Court faced the first copyright infringement suit against CATV operators in 1968, however,
24.
25.
supra.
26.

476 F.2d at 342 n.2.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970). The statute refers to "dramatic works." See note 8

17 U.S.C. §§ l(c), (d) (1970).
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 598 (1969).
28. 5 F.2d 411, 412 (6th Cir. 1925).
29. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
30. The Buck court found that "[olne who manually or by human agency merely
actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that are omnipresent in the
air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not 'perform' within the meaning
of the Copyright Law." Id. at 735.
31. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
32. Id. at 201.

27. 37
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the Court held in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc. 3: that CATV systems do not perform under the Copyright Act.
The Court, using a functional test, characterized the CATV system
as a viewer, not a broadcaster, and found that only broadcasters
perform.3 4 Fortnightly involved a CATV system that intercepted
signals of local stations; the Court found that the system only enhanced the viewer's ability to receive signals already present in the
35
community and thus served the same function as a home antenna.
The Court pointed out that application of pre-television concepts
embodied in the 1909 Copyright Act to the technology of the 1960's
makes it very difficult to formulate a precise definition of "performance. '3 Although there have been several attempts to update the
Act so as to cover specifically the recent technological developments
of CATV, the proposed revisions have not been adopted. 37 Congres33. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
34. The Court found that television viewing resulted from the combined activity of
broadcasters and viewers. Broadcasters either produce the programs or obtain them from a
network or some other source and then convert the images and audible sounds of the program
into electronic signals which they broadcast at radio frequency for public reception. Viewers,
however, by means of television sets and antennas, receive the broadcasters' signals and
reconvert them into visible images and audible sounds. Id. at 397-98.
35. The Court found that "[essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the
viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with
an efficient connection to the viewer's television set . . . . [T]he basic function the equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by a
television viewer." 392 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted); accord, Lilly v. United States, 238
F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1956) (holding that CATV "was a mere adjunct of the television receiving
sets with which it was connected").
36. 392 U.S. at 395.
37. "A revision of the 1909 Act was begun in 1955 when Congress authorized a
program of studies by the Copyright Office. Progress has not been rapid. The Copyright
Office issued its report in 1961. Register of Copyrights, Report on the General Revision
of the U.S. Copyright Law, House Judiciary Committee Print, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961). Revision bills were introduced in the House in the Eighty-eighth Congress and
in both the House and the Senate in the Eighty-ninth Congress. See H.R. 11947, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 before Subcommittee No. 3 of
the House Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess . (1965); Hearings on S. 1006 before
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the-Senate Judiciary
Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). H.R. 4347 was reported favorably by the House
Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), but not enacted.
In the Ninetieth Congress revision bills were again introduced in both the House (H.R.
2512) and the Senate (S.597). The House bill was again reported favorably, H.R. Rep.
No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), and this time, after amendment, passed by the full
House. 113 Cong. Rec. 9021. The bill as reported contained a provision dealing with
CATV, but the provision was struck from the bill on the House floor prior to enactment.
The House and Senate Bills are currently pending before the Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights."
392 U.S. at 396 n.17.
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sional inaction in updating the Act and CATV's increasing economic impact on copyright holders have prompted the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) to enact rules regulating the
operations of CATV systems,3 pursuant to powers granted them
under the Communications Act of 1934. 31The rules require a CATV
system to carry all local and other "significantly viewed television
signals." 4 In addition, the rules permit CATV to carry a total of
three full network affiliated stations and three independent stations, but distant signals may be imported from no more than two
independent stations.' The FCC rules are very comprehensive and
provide some protection for copyright holders through the restriction on importation, but because the rules do allow limited importation of distant signals, the question of copyright liability has remained open.
Noting that the complaint charged five specific CATV systems
with copyright infringement, the instant court first discussed the
various operations conducted by those systems; it found that the
different systems received television signals originating within the
community as well as signals received off-the-air at points ranging
from 43 to 600 miles away. The court also stated that the systems
used both antennae and microwave links, and that some originated
their own programming. 2 The court then turned to the Fortnightly
decision and compared the then-existing technology with the technological advancements of the 1970's. The court found that
Fortnightlywas concerned only with a CATV system that operated
as a reception service, while the systems in the instant case origi38. 47 C.F.R. § 76 et seq. (1972).
39. The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1970), and was given broad regulatory powers over radio and television broadcasting, 47
U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309 (1970). But despite this grant of power, the FCC initially refused to
regulate the activities of CATV, because they doubted that they had jurisdiction over the
systems. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958). However, as CATV
systems modernized and expanded into the big city areas and threatened local television
stations, the FCC asserted indirect jurisdiction in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32
F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963); then ancillary jurisdiction in the
Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725 (1966); and finally full jurisdiction over
CATV systems. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968), upheld the FCC's power to regulate CATV. For a thorough discussion of the new
FCC rules see Barrow, supra note 3.
40. 47 C.F.R. § 76.61 (1972). See also Barrow, supra note 3, at 705.
41. Id. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1972), requiring CATV systems to originate their own programming, has been suspended pending judicial review. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp.,
476 F.2d 338, 349 n.13 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. In addition, the court found that some of the systems sold commercial time and
some interconnected with other CATV systems.
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nated programming, used microwave links, and imported distant
signals. These differences between the CATV system in Fortnightly
and the instant CATV systems led the court to find that the
Fortnightlyholding could have only limited bearing on the instant
decision. The court recognized, however, that the functional test set
forth in Fortnightlywas still viable, and turned to consider whether
the technological developments made by CATV transformed the
systems from viewers to performers.13 The court reasoned that because the system's origination and reception services were different
operations they should be considered separately.4 The court found
that under the copyright law, program origination by a CATV system did not convert that system into a performer of those programs
it imported off-the-air.1 The court also found that the use of microwave links did not by itself convert a CATV system into a performer
since microwave is simply an alternative to cable in transmitting
the broadcast signals." The court did find, however, that the importation of distant signals substantially changed the function of a
CATV system. The court found that the function of importing
distant signals was not before the Fortnightly Court and thus
Fortnightlywas not controlling on that issue.47 The court characterized the distant importation function as broadcasting"5 and found
that broadcasters do in fact perform. 9 Thus, the court held that
when a CATV system imports distant signals that would not otherwise be receivable in a community on either a private rooftop antenna or a large community antenna located in or near the CATV
community, the CATV system performs and is subject to copyright
liability. Recognizing the need to define a "distant signal," the
court found that a precise judicial definition was not possible; instead, the court defined signals that are not distant. Establishing
43. See note 35, supra.
44. CBS, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 347-48 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. Id.
46. The court also found that the sale of commercial time and the interconnection of
different CATV systems did not change the function of CATV.
47. The court said that the Fortnightly Court dealt with signals which "were already
in the community and were not imported by the CATV system from another community, as
is evidenced by the fact that the system received them from an antenna located in or directly
adjacent to the CATV community." 476 F.2d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. The court reasoned that broadcasters' transmission of signals over long distances
to viewers who but for this transmission would not be able to view the television programs,
was the same function that the CATV systems engaged in by the use of long distance microwave links. Id. at 349-50.
49. See Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288, 290-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) for the proposition that broadcasters perform.
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that a CATV community is an area served by the CATV system and
designated in a franchise issued to it by a state or local governmental body or regulatory authority,w the court held that any signal
capable of projecting-without relay or retransmittal-an acceptable image that a CATV system can receive off-the-air during a substantial portion of the time by means of an antenna erected in or
adjacent to the CATV community is not a distant signal. Moreover,
the court decided that a signal would be presumed distant in cases
where the signal was transmitted from an originating community to
a CATV community by microwave or cable and where the signal is
initially received by a CATV system, an antenna, or some other
receiving device located between the two communities. Thus the
court concluded that while two of defendant's CATV systems, which
received only non-distant signals, had clearly not infringed plaintiff's copyrights, the remaining three, should be presumed to have
infringed those copyrights by importing "distant signals," unless
there is a contrary showing on remand to the trial courtsA'
The instant decision will tend to restrict considerably the present scope and future development of CATV. Unless CATV operators
are able and willing to pay the price demanded by copyright holders, 52 CATV will be forced to revert to local programming to avoid
copyright liability. In following the test espoused by the instant
court, CATV may not be able to operate at all in some smaller
communities that are too far from conventional television signals,
thus totally depriving those communities of television. On the other
hand, copyright holders and local television stations will benefit
immensely from the instant decision. Copyright holders will now be
able to control the dissemination of their programs in distant markets, and they will have an opportunity to collect additional fees for
their works from CATV operators who perform them. In addition,
50. See 476 F.2d 338, 351 n.16 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. The court found that the New York and Elmira systems had not infringed plaintiffs'
copyrights and that the Rawlins, Great Falls, and Farmington systems had presumably
infringed the copyrights. Id. at 352-53.
52. "Almost all television programs with rerun value (i.e., excluding news and most live
sports) are copyrighted. Although networks do not customarily hold the copyrights, they often
participate in rerun revenues (known in industry parlance as syndication receipts) or act as
syndication brokers through arrangements with producers.
"Virtually all programs are sold to networks or stations on the basis of exclusive contracts, commonly running from two to seven years. The distributor agrees not to sell the same
program to any other broadcast station (frequently including cable outlets) within an area
surrounding the buying station." Chazen & Ross, FederalRegulation of Cable Television: The
Visible Hand, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1820, 1821-22 (1970).
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if CATV systems are unable to afford these programs, local television stations will no longer compete with distant stations for viewers
in a CATV community. Notwithstanding the new restrictions
placed on CATV operators by the decision, the instant court correctly resolved the issue presented in light of the statute and available precedents. The wording of the 1909 Copyright Act clearly does
not anticipate a phenomenon such as CATV; thus the application
of this antiquated Act to modern inventions has hampered courts'
development of a proper concept of performance. The functional
test advanced by the Fortnightly Court seems to be the best judicial solution, and the instant court, taking into account additional
technological advancements, logically extended the Fortnightly
rationale to the instant facts. Recognizing that "[t]he complex
problems presented by the issues in this case are not readily amenable to judicial resolution, 5 3 the court appealed to Congress to enact
legislation which would accommodate the competing copyright and
communications policy considerations in light of modem CATV
technology. 54 Although no legislation has been enacted yet, there
was recently introduced in the Senate a comprehensive Copyright
Revision Bill,5 which seeks to remedy the problems that confronted
the instant court. The bill contains a practical definition of "performance"56 and indicates when a CATV system is liable for copyright infringement. 5 The bill is now in committee, but chances for
its ultimate adoption are questionable in light of prior congressional
reluctance to enact proposed revisions.8 If this bill is not passed,
courts probably will resort to the new FCC rules for guidance59 when
confronted with a CATV copyright infringement suit. Although the
53. 476 F.2d at 354.
54. Id.
55. The bill was introduced by Senator McClellan on Mar. 26, 1973. S. 1361, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
56. "To perform or display a work 'publicly' means:
"(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered;
"(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times." Id. at § 101.
57. Id. at § 111.
58. See note 37 supra.
59. 47 C.F.R. § 76.01 et seq. (1972).
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FCC is by definition a regulatory agency, their new rules are in
effect copyright legislation because they protect copyright holders
by imposing a limit of two stations from which a CATV system may
import distant signals. Consequently, the FCC rules tend to restrict
the scope of CATV as much as the instant decision does. The primary appeal of the CATV systems has been their ability to afford
the viewer a wide choice of entertainment via numerous channel
selections. By restricting CATV's importation to two distant signals, the FCC may cause those systems to lose subscribers since the
systems in many cases will be able to offer only the signals of stations which are already available to the viewer, or at most two
additional signals. Thus, unless CATV systems are able to raise new
capital through program origination or advertising, many may be
forced out of business. Therefore, the only means of preserving
CATV may be congressional legislation. Members of both the CATV
and the television industries have compromised and agreed on legislation'" whereby CATV would recognize its obligation to pay reasonable copyright fees, and copyright holders would agree to grant compulsory licenses permitting CATV to carry local and distant signals.' They have also agreed to submit to compulsory arbitration
in the event no agreement on a reasonable fee can be reached.12
Congress, therefore, has legislation before it which could solve the
problems faced by the instant court and the FCC. Since neither has
been able to deal adequately with the problem, Congress should
take the initiative and enact appropriate legislation.

Criminal Law-Right to Counsel-Sixth Amendment Does Not Grant Accused the Right to Counsel at Pretrial Photographic Display
Respondent, convicted in federal district court of bank robbery,' appealed his conviction alleging denial of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 2 Prior to trial, and to ensure positive in-court
60. 37 Fed. Reg. 3260 (1972); see Barrow, supra note 3, at 703.
61. 37 Fed. Reg. 3341 (1972); see Barrow, supra note 3, at 703.
62. Id.
1. Respondent Ash and codefendant Bailey were indicted on 5 counts relating to the
Aug. 26, 1965 robbery of a Washington, D.C., bank. United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92, 94
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2. The sixth amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
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identification, the prosecution had conducted a photographic display during which its witnesses identified respondent as a participant in the robbery, 3 and at which neither respondent nor his counsel were present. The trial judge admitted this post-indictment photographic identification into evidence in addition to the witnesses'
courtroom identification4 of respondent.' Respondent contended on
appeal that the post-indictment photographic display was a critical
stage in the prosecution at which the presence of counsel was required by the sixth amendment. The prosecution argued that a
photographic identification session which the accused does not attend cannot give rise to a right to counsel. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit adopted respondent's position and
reversed. 7 On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed. The sixth amendment does not grant the accused the
right to have counsel present at photographic displays conducted by
the government for the purpose of allowing its witnesses to attempt
an identification of the offender. United States v. Ash, - U.S.
-, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973).
In a series of cases beginning with Powell v. Alabama,' the
Supreme Court has developed the principle that the sixth amendment requires representation by counsel of all defendants in state
3. In preparation for trial, the prosecutor used the photographic display to determine
whether the witnesses he planned to call would be able to make courtroom identifications of
the accused. The display was held less than 24 hours before the trial, nearly 3 years after the
robbery itself. There were 5 color photographs in the display, including one each of Ash and
codefendant Bailey. While each man pictured was approximately the same age, height, and
weight as respondent, only he and Bailey were pictured full-length; the other 3 subjects were
cut off at mid-thigh, waist, and mid-chest respectively. Furthermore, only the pictures of the
2 defendants bore police identification markings. At the display, 3 of the witnesses selected
respondent's picture, but the fourth was unable to make any selection. 461 F.2d at 95-96.
4. At the trial, all 4 witnesses made courtroom identifications of respondent Ash, but
only one of the witnesses was positive of the identification. Id. at 95.
5. The only other proof against Ash was the testimony of an informer who was then
serving a sentence in connection with another robbery. The defense called an Assistant
United States Attorney who testified that he had indicated to the informer his intention to
testify on the informer's behalf before the parole board. Id. at 97. Other "favors" granted to
the informer in exchange for his testimony against Ash were indicated in trial testimony. Id.
at 97, n.7. After a hung jury, codefendant Bailey was acquitted on motion to the trial judge.
Id. at 95.
6. At an earlier preindictment photographic display, the 4 witnesses to the robbery
tentatively identified respondent as one of the gunmen. Respondent did not assert a right to
counsel at that session since Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) ("showup" or confrontation
of any eye-witness and a lone suspect shortly after his apprehension), forecloses application
of the sixth amendment to events prior to the initiation of formal adversarial criminal proceedings. See notes 24-26 infra and accompanying text.
7. 461 F.2d at 105.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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and federal criminal trials involving potential loss of liberty.' Having begun to recognize in Powell that the period from arraignment
to trial necessarily involves problems of procedural intricacy0 and
prosecutorial advocacy" which render that period as critical to the
preservation of a defendant's liberties as the trial itself, 2 the Court
has held more recently that the assistance of counsel is required at
any "critical stage" of the proceedings against an accused. 3 The
Court has found "critical stages" for sixth amendment purposes
whenever "substantial rights" of the accused may be adversely affected. 1 For example, in Hamilton v. A labama15 the Court held an
arraignment to be "critical stage," even where the defendant had
entered a plea of not guilty, since under Alabama law several crucial
defenses are considered waived if not pleaded at the arraignment. 6
In United States v. Wade, '7 the Court applied the "critical stage"
analysis to post-indictment lineups. Considering first the relative
unreliability of eyewitness identification at lineups, 5 and then ex9. In Powell, the Court carefully limited the extension of the counsel guarantee to
capital cases where an indigent defendant was incapable of adequately defending himself due
to ignorance, feeble-mindedness, or illiteracy. However, the Court indicated that counsel may
be needed at every step in such proceedings. Id. at 71. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). the Court held that the sixth amendment required federal courts to appoint counsel
in all federal felony cases. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),held that the Johnson ruling
was not applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment due process clause, but 21
years later this case was overruled. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court
held that the fourteenth amendment imposes an absolute right to counsel for indigent defendants in state felony prosecutions. More recently, the Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972), that the counsel guarantee attaches to any criminal case, including
misdemeanors, if the person charged with the offense will be incarcerated upon a guilty
verdict.
10. See 287 U.S. at 69.
11. Id. at 72; accord, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
12. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (defendant appeared without appointed counsel for sentencing when sentencing had been delayed by a grant of probation). See also cases
cited note 14 infra.
13. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52, 54 (1961); see cases cited note 12 supra.
14. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
accord, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (established due process guidelines for police
interrogations; an accused must be advised of his right to counsel and his right to remain
silent prior to questioning by police); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (counsel
required at "surreptitious interrogation"; government arranged meeting between accused and
government informer).
15. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
16. Id. at 53-54; accord, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (defendant pleaded
guilty at preliminary hearing, then pleaded not guilty at arraignment; evidence of earlier plea
made without assistance of counsel held inadmissable).
17. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
18. Id. at 230-31.
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amining the "grave potential" for prejudicial influence inherent in
the scientific imprecision of the lineup itself,'9 the Court reasoned
that the presence of defense counsel at the lineup not only would
deter prejudicial prosecutorial behavior but also would result in a
more accurate reconstruction of the lineup at trial, thus assuring a
"meaningful confrontation" on the issue of prejudicial lineup practices. The Court therefore concluded that a post-indictment lineup
is a "critical stage" at which the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches. 20 In a parallel development, the Court held in Simmons v.
United States2' that initial eyewitness identification of a suspect by2
photographic display is not in and of itself violative of due process. 2
Noting that effective cross-examination could demonstrate to a jury
the potential for erroneous photographic identification by a witness,
the Court approved initial photographic identification procedures
unless they are so suggestive as to involve substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification. 23 The Burger Court first examined the
"critical stage" test in 1972 in Kirby v. Illinois24 and, in the context
of preindictment lineups, 21 held that formal commencement of adversarial criminal proceedings is a necessary precondition to the
19. The Court noted that numerous opportunities for subtle suggestion are present,
such as placing the suspect in a lineup with persons dissimilar in appearance, dressing only
the suspect in clothes similar to those worn by the culprit, and indicating to the witness which
member of the lineup is suspected by another witness. Id. at 232-33; see P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26-27 (1965); Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible
Suggestion: Evolving Limitationson the Abuse of Pre-trialCriminalIdentificationMethods,
38 BRooKLYN L. REV. 261, 263-67 (1971).
20. 388 U.S. at 236-37. The Court considered the capacity of the unrepresented accused
to provide testimony regarding the lineup and deemed such capacity inadequate for 2 reasons:
first, the suspect usually suffers from a lack of training in and sensitivity to suggestive
influences, and his tense emotional state precludes accurate observation, id. at 230-31; secondly, the suspect's ability to offer useful testimony if he does observe abuse is lessened not
only by his subsequent vulnerability to cross-examination and admission of prior conviction
records, but also by the probable lack of credence to be given his unsupported version in the
face of contrary police testimony. Id. at 231.
Two other "lineup" cases were decided the same day: Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967), which, in applying Wade to the states, held that testimony concerning pretrial identification at a lineup where counsel was not present is subject to a per se exclusionary rule;
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), which limited Wade and Gilbert to prospective
application.
21. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
22. Id. at 384.
23. Id. Even though Simmons was a due process case dealing only with the investigative
stage where authorities were trying to expedite the apprehension of the felon, many courts
have adopted its standard for the admissibility of any photographic identification. E.g.,
United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970).
24. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
25. Id. at 690; see note 6 supra.
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"critical stage" determination. " Prior to the instant case, nine of
the United States circuit courts of appeal had expressly refused to
extend the sixth amendment right to counsel to post-indictment
photographic identification sessions,2 although several state high
28
courts had done so.
In the instant case, the Court first reviewed the early history
of the right to counsel 29 and emphasized that such history illustrated
a concern primarily for the fair treatment of the accused at trial,
where he is confronted with both the complexity of courtroom procedure and the professional advocacy of the prosecutor.'" The Court
then discussed the more recent expansion of the counsel guarantee
to certain "critical" pretrial events3' and noted that each of these
events also involves a trial-like confrontation between the accused
and the complex procedural system, the expertise of his prosecutorial adversary, or both. 32 Analyzing Wade in this context, the
Court asserted that the paramount reason for the guarantee of counsel at post-indictment lineups is the attorney's capacity to assist his
client in the preservation of his legal defenses, not only by preventing prosecutorial overreaching, but also by providing a method for
accurate courtroom reconstruction of the circumstances surrounding the lineup without requiring the accused to testify and thereby
33
to sacrifice his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The Court concluded that the test of criticality applied in Wade
included a mandatory determination that there be a trial-like con26. The Court dealt only with the narrow question of what constituted a "stage" in the
prosecution and refused to address the broader "criticality" determination upon which Wade
had largely rested. Id. at 696-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As the vast majority of lineups are
obviously held prior to the initiation of formal adversarial criminal proceedings, the Kirby
decision represents a significant practical limitation on Wade.
27. United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 301-02 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972); United States v.
Serio, 440 F.2d 827, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1971); Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127, 130-32 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Collins,
416 F.2d 696, 698-700 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970); United States v.
Bennet, 409 F.2d 888, 898-900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Haywood v. United States,
396 U.S. 852 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64, 67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 926 (1969); McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434,436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
908 (1969).
28. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738, cert.denied, 400 U.S. 919 (1970).
29. 93 S. Ct. at 2572-73.
30. Id. at 2573.
31. See cases cited notes 12-16, 20 supra.
32. 93 S. Ct. at 2574.
33. Id. at 2575.
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frontation of the accused and the prosecutorial system before the
right to counsel would attach.3 4 Having thus qualified the holding
in Wade, the Court turned to the circuit court opinion in the instant
case and found the necessary "confrontation" element lacking in
photographic identification sessions, held solely for the prosecution's trial preparation, which the accused does not attend." Rejecting the circuit court determination that the inherent dangers of
suggestivity automatically render all photographic displays "critical" events, the Court asserted that this approach merely raised
without answering the ultimate question whether the trial itself will
provide adequate protection of a defendant's rights if the pretrial
event is conducted without presence of defense counsel. 6 The Court
concluded that the requirement of equal access to witnesses and
photographs removes any inequities in the adversarial process itself
and thereby satisfies the goal of professional parity implicit in the
sixth amendment counsel guarantee. 31 Noting that the ethical responsibility of the public prosecutor is the primary safeguard
against the potential for prejudicial prosecutorial behavior inherent
in the use of photographic displays, the Court concluded that judicial review under the due process standard as articulated in
Simmons 38 satisfies all constitutional requirements should that ethical safeguard fail. 39 The Court therefore reversed the circuit court's
application of the sixth amendment and remanded the case to the
district court for consideration of the due process issue.'
Although the instant decision invites the superficial criticism
that the Court has retreated somewhat from its earlier position of
concern for the protection of defendants' constitutional rights in
criminal cases, the paramount significance of the case is its laudable
return to a reasonable conception of the proper roles of counsel and
court in the preservation of those rights. The seemingly artificial,
semantic imposition of the "confrontation" requirement upon the
34. Id.at 2576.
35. Id.at 2577.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2578.
38. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
39. 93 S. Ct. at 2579.
40. Id. In his dissenting opinion Justice Brennan, author of the Wade majority opinion,
argued that the scientific imprecision inherent in photographic identifications and the inability to reconstruct the event adequately at trial conclusively established "criticality." Moreover, he found that the absence of the accused from the photographic identification further
reduced the likelihood that irregularities in the procedure would ever come to light. Id. at
2588.
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"critical stage" test actually represents this Court's understandable
dissatisfaction with the lawyer-witness role tentatively advanced by
Wade." The Wade majority suggested that lineups might no longer
be considered "critical stages" of prosecution if legislative or administrative controls were imposed to alleviate the dangerous potential
for suggestivity and misidentification inherent in unregulated encounters. 2 It is thus reasonable to infer that the application of the
counsel guarantee in that case was designed as a temporary cure for
due process defects in lineup procedure which the Court felt should
be remedied on a more permanent basis by legislative or administrative action. The instant Court has properly declined to extend
further this approach to due process defects in the criminal justice
system. Rather than expanding the function of counsel beyond its
traditional and appropriate boundaries, the Court apparently has
chosen to face squarely the due process issues raised by photographic identification procedures. As this decision recognizes, the
fundamentally adversarial structure of the criminal justice system
requires that the counsel guarantee be invoked to preserve parity in
the legal contest between the accused and the prosecution. An unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of this parity, however, is
that the defense counsel and the prosecutor each possess the independent capacity to mislead or coerce witnesses in the process of
preparing for trial.13 The sixth amendment counsel guarantee,
therefore, is not offended by this decision, which merely refuses to
require that one party to the contest be allowed to monitor personally the trial preparation of the other. Effective cross-examination
within the doctrinal framework of the due process clause remains,
except in cases of utterly invidious prosecutorial abuse, as adequate
protection of the rights of the accused. The Court properly acknowledges that mere presence of defense counsel at identification sessions would afford no meaningful protection from this latter class
of abusive practices, and it further recognizes that reliance on the
prosecutor's faithfulness to his ethical responsibility is, realistically,
the only available protection from his intentional abuse of power.4
41. See 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967). The fundamental nature of the ideological shift in the
instant case, and earlier in Kirby, is illustrated by the way individual justices voted in Wade
and in Ash. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Wade, see note 40 supra,
wrote the dissenting opinion here, joined by Justice Douglas, the only remaining Wade majority member, and by Justice Marshall, a Johnson appointee. The Ash majority is comprised
of Justices White and Stewart-Wade dissenters-and the 4 Nixon appointees to the Court.
42. 388 U.S. at 237.
43. See 93 S. Ct. at 2578.
44. See id. at 2579.
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The instant decision, however, could conceivably lead to the potentially dangerous result that police departments may attempt to circumvent the Wade requirements by using photographic displays
instead of lineups for all eye-witness identifications. 5 It is arguable
that the same characteristics of two-dimensional rigidity which
allow suggestiveness and create comparative inaccuracy in the photographic medium4 6 also render this type of identification more susceptible than the more fluid lineup to effective regulation. Due to
the present lack of thoughtful legislative or administrative regulation of identification procedures, the case-by-case approach
adopted in Simmons47 seems inadequate. Since photographic identification procedures are used so frequently by prosecutors, and since
such procedures would be quite susceptible to regulation, such a
case-by-case approach would unnecessarily deter development of
sound due process standards.4" Instead, courts should follow the
Mirandamodel and promulgate guidelines which would ensure both
the fairness and accuracy of photographic identification procedures
to the greatest possible extent.4 9
45. This would be highly unfortunate, as photographic identifications are certainly less
reliable than lineups. See materials cited note 47 infra. Arguably, an accused is entitled to
the most accurate method readily available.
At least one commentator has pointed out that "eyewitness identification is the most
unreliable form of evidence and causes more miscarriages of justice than any other method
of proof." M. HouTs, FROM EVIDENCE TO PROOF 10-11 (1956). The issue of identification arises
primarily in robbery and rape cases, where there is often little time for the victim to observe
the assailant. Often the emotional balance of the victim or eyewitness is so disturbed by his
extraordinary experiences that his perception becomes distorted. Other motives, such as the
desire to requite a crime, to exact vengeance upon the person believed guilty, or to find a
scapegoat, also enter into the identification. E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT xiii
(1932).
46. See notes 19, 20, 23, 40, 45 supra.For a discussion of the possibilities for impermissible suggestion in the context of photographic displays see P. WALL, supra note 19, at 68-73.
For a discussion of the unconscious suggestion that a photographic identification process may
have on the accuracy of a subsequent corporeal identification see Williams & Hammelmann,
IdentificationParades(pts. 1 & 2), 1963 CRIM. L. Rv. 479, 545; 56 IowA L. Rav. 408 (1970).
47. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 45, 46 supra and accompanying text. See also 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967).
49. See note 14 supra; notes 45, 46 supra and accompanying text. For a comprehensive
statutory proposal regulating pretrial identification procedures see Murray, The Criminal
Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 610. For a more general discussion accompanied by suggested procedural reforms see 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1296 (1969); 56 IowA L. REv. 408
(1970); 47 NEB. L. REv. 740 (1968). See also P. WALL, supra note 19, at 68-73.
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Labor Law-Strikes-Union Has Implied Obligation Under No-Strike Clause to Use Every Reasonable Means to End Wildcat Strike
Pursuant to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act,' plaintiff employers 2 brought an action against defendant local
and international unions 3 for damages resulting from "wildcat
strikes." 4 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' failure to use every reasonable means to end the strikes5 constituted a breach of no-strike
provisions' in their collective bargaining agreements. 7 Defendants
asserted that a provision of the agreement stating that the Union
would not be liable for any "unauthorized acts" of members expressly precluded union liability for such unauthorized strikes.' The
federal district court held, judgment for plaintiffs.9 Implied in the
1. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970).
2. The instant case is a consolidation of 2 actions: Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters
Union (International and Local 249), and Daniels Motor Freight, Inc. v. Teamsters Union
(International and Local 377). The facts of the 2 cases are so closely related that all discussion
will apply to both cases unless otherwise indicated.
3. The international union denied that it was a party to the contracts in question. The
court, however, found that the international was a party through its wholly controlled "National Committee," a signatory to the contracts.
4. The court defined the term "wildcat strike" to mean a strike that is not authorized
by union officials, rather than one not authorized by the labor agreements. Eazor Express,
Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 357 F. Supp. 158, 161 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The strikes began when
members of Local 377 walked out over discharge of 2 employees by Daniels for refusing work
assignments. Local 249 struck both to honor the Local 377 picket line and to demonstrate its
own grievances over working conditions at Eazor.
5. The contract between Daniels and Local 377 contained an express provision making
it mandatory for the union to ". . .undertake every reasonable means to induce [striking]
employees to return to their jobs during any [unauthorized strike]." 357 F. Supp. at 162.
Because a similar provision was not included in the contract between Eazor and Local 249,
defendants international and Local 249 asserted that they had no liability to Eazor.
6. The National Master Freight Agreement, which was signed by all the parties, contained a no-strike provision as follows: "The Union[s] and the Employers agree that there
shall be no strike, lockout, tie-up or legal proceedings without first using all possible means
of [al settlement, as provided for in this Agreement, . .. of any controversy which might
arise." Id. at 161. Neither of the grievances had been processed through the steps of the
grievance machinery at the time of the strikes. Id. at 161 n.5.
7. Daniels alleged that the Local 377 strike was authorized by union officials, but the
court determined that it was not. Id. at 163.
8. The National Master Freight Agreement stated: "Job Stewards and alternates have
no authority to take strike action . ., except as authorized by official action of the Local
Union. The Employer recognizes these limitations upon the authority of job stewards and
their alternates, and shall not hold the Union liable for any unauthorized acts." Id. at 162.
9. The nonjury trial was bifurcated and only evidence concerning liability was presented. Id. at 161 n.2.
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"no-strike" provision of a collective bargaining agreement is a
union's obligation to use all reasonable means, both punitive and
persuasive, to induce wildcat strikers to return to work. Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Traditionally, a labor union's liability for the acts of its members has been restricted to acts authorized or subsequently ratified
by union officials.'0 With the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
in 1932, Congress established a standard of "clear proof" of union
involvement or authorization that must be met before the union will
be liable for members' acts." The application of this standard, however, created evidentiary difficulties for an employer damaged by a
wildcat strike.' 2 Recognizing this difficulty, Congress limited the
clear proof standard in the Labor-Management Relations Act
(L.M.R.A.)." 3 Under the L.M.R.A. a union is liable for the acts of
its agents,'4 and in determining the agency relationship, a union's
10. United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 847 (1955); In re New York Times Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 31, 152 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956).
See also Garmeada Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956);
Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950); General Magnetic
Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, Local 937, 328 Mich. 542,44 N.W.2d 140 (1950). This standard
has been applied to criminal as well as civil damage suits. United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
But see United States v. Railroad Trainmen, 27 L.R.R.M. 2308 (N.D. 111. 1951). See generally
M. FORKOScH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW §§ 176-84 (1965).
11. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970). Section 6 of the Act provides:
"No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization
participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court
of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except
upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after knowledge thereof." Id. § 6. This standard was applied in numerous
civil and criminal cases. See, e.g., Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971); UMW v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966); Harlem River Consumers Cooperative, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of
Harlem, Inc., 450 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Adler, Section 6 of the NorrisLaGuardiaAct: The Chameleons Are Coming, 24 LAB. L.J. 131 (1973).
12. Inherent in a wildcat strike is the possibility that a union may secretly encourage
the illegal activities while publicly urging strikers back to work. Proving such action on the
part of the union without an informer is extremely difficult.
13. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 185
et seq. (1970). Section 301(a) of the Act provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States . . . ." Id. § 301(a),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1953);
Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950) (holding that
§ 301(a) allows federal courts to fashion substantive law from national labor policies). In
debate over the bill, Senator Taft, sponsor of the Act, remarked that it was designed to avoid
the standard of clear proof announced in United States v. International Bhd. of Carpenters,
330 U.S. 395 (1947). 93 CONG. Rac. 7001 (1947).
14. Section 301(b) provides, in part: "Any labor organization which represents employ-
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authorization or subsequent ratification of specific acts is not controlling. 5 The L.M.R.A.'s agency test was applied in United Mine
Workers v. Patton,16 where the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the absence of formal union approval of a member's acts will not preclude a finding of agency if the union member
is acting in his official capacity. In addition to the statutory agency
principle, a similar, judicially created doctrine-the "mass action"
principle-has given rise to union liability for wildcat strikes. The
mass action principle was first applied in United States v. United
Mine Workers, '7 in which the court held that "as long as a union is
functioning as a union it must be responsible for the mass action of
its members."' 8 The mass action principle recognizes that action on
the part of a substantial number of union members is actually union
activity, even though it lacks official authorization. 9 Some courts
have gone beyond the activity attribution question and have considered whether inactivity of union officials in the face of a wildcat
strike creates union liability. Two cases illustrate the divergent positions that courts have taken concerning the union's duty to take
positive action to return wildcat strikers to work. In United Construction Workers v. Haislip,2 the Fourth Circuit held that positive
action on the part of union officials is not required where the union
has neither adopted, encouraged, nor prolonged the strike. 2' The
Fifth Circuit, however, in Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America 22 held that the absence of union measures reaees in an industry affecting commerce . . . and any employer whose activities affect commerce . . . shall be bound by the acts of its agents." Labor-Management Relations Act
§ 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970).
15. Section 301(e) provides: "For the purposes of this section, in determining whether
any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized
or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." Id. § 301(e), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1970).
16. 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954).
17. 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
871 (1949).
18. 77 F. Supp. at 566. See also Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971); Colt's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Local 376, 314 F. Supp. 578 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. International Union,
UMW, 89 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1950).
19. This situation must be distinguished from an unauthorized strike involving only a
few union employees. Only when all of the union employees engage in a wildcat strike are
they to be considered a union entity.
20. 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
21. Id. at 877.
22. 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971) (secondary boycott,
workers refused to cross picket lines).
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sonably calculated to return strikers to work indicates union acquiescence or sanction of an illegal activity.? None of the cases that
have considered this duty of positive action have faced the question
of a union's duty where its collective bargaining agreement contains
a provision precluding liability for the unauthorized acts of members.
In the instant case, the court declined to apply the mass action
principle to find liability, reasoning that, in light of the specific
contract provision denying union liability for unauthorized acts, its
application would rewrite the contract for the parties. Rather, the
court implied from a no-strike provision an affirmative duty on the
part of a union to undertake all reasonable means to induce wildcat
strikers to return to work. The court found that the implied obligation was so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they
deemed its expression unnecessary. 24 Furthermore, the court noted
that in a collective bargaining agreement the employer deals with
his employees collectively in exchange for the assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agreement.? This agreement is meaningless if the union is able to publicly disavow the
strike while privately supporting the strikers. Moreover, the court
emphasized the reasonableness of measures designed to induce
strikers to return to work because the benefits obtained through
collective bargaining inure directly to the union members. The court
also stated that the emphasis of federal labor law policy upon peaceful arbitration 26 is consistent with the union's implied obligation.
Applying the union's affirmative duty to the facts of the case, the
court held that reasonable means included exercise of the union's
23. A similar rationale was advanced in United States v. Railroad Trainmen, 27
L.R.R.M. 2308 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (criminal liability for contempt). The court also utilized the
mass action principle.
24. The court quoted from an earlier decision that had set out the principles that control
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. 357 F. Supp. at 164; see Kellogg Co.
v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 1972), quoting, Refinery Employees' Union v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723, 731 (W.D. La. 1958).
25. "[The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective
[bargaining] agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the
agreement." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1947). Thirty-two %of the collective
bargaining contracts in the United States today that contain no-strike provisions also contain
provisions limiting union liability, but in all but 2% of these the union is required to take
positive action in order to avoid liability. Eighty-seven% of such clauses require the union to
order a resumption of work and 53% require a public disavowal of the stoppage. 2 CoLL. BARG.
NEG. & CONTR. 77:1-2 (1971). For illustrative contract provisions see id. at 77:151-54 (1972).
26. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1953).
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powers to fine, lift the books of members,2 7 or place locals in trusteeship, and that the failure to do so constituted a breach of the implied obligation.
A practical effect of the instant decision may well be the general
inclusion of provisions in collective bargaining agreements that provide for a union's affirmative duty to use all reasonable means to
end wildcat strikes. The parties to the contract may also specify,
more completely, the means to be undertaken. 28 More significantly,
perhaps, by requiring exercise of the union's power to levy fines and
threaten suspension of striking members the instant decision will
lessen a union's ability to encourage secretly a wildcat strike while
publicly urging members back to work. This affirmative duty, however, may cause serious difficulties within a union itself. A wildcat
strike supported by a substantial portion of a local's membership
might create an internal power struggle that would be accentuated
by the union's duty of affirmative action. Therefore, it may be questioned whether sound public policy dictates such intrusion into a
union's internal affairs. 29 Despite this problem, however, the practical effect of the instant decision is grounded in sound federal labor
policy. Certainly, the employer who bargains in good faith should
have a remedy against the dangers of a wildcat strike.30 Since individual union members are not liable, 3' it is logical that the union
officials should be held responsible for exercising all reasonable
means to end the strike. Moreover, the means suggested by the
court are well within the powers of the union and should prove
effective to enforce the no-strike contract provisions. This union
responsibility necessarily will encourage the peaceful arbitration of
labor disputes, and consequently, employers will have more incentive to enter into collective bargaining negotiation. Nevertheless,
the court could have reached its result by more analytically sound
means. The court implied a duty of affirmative action despite a
specific contract provision denying liability for unauthorized acts.
These seemingly opposite provisions were reconciled on the theory
27. Lifting the books of union members insures that they will not be employed at other
union plants during the strike.
28. See, e.g., 2 COLL. BARG. NEG. & CONTR. 77:151-54 (1972).
29. See Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNEL L. RFv. 672, 701-02 (1967).
30. The possibility of injunctive relief was recognized by the Supreme Court in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248-49 (1970). This possibility was
not discussed in the instant case, although in most situations it would prove to be a major
solution to the problem of a wildcat strike.
31. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
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that the implied obligation was so clearly within the contemplation
of the parties that they deemed its expression unnecessary. 2 The
court apparently did not consider the possibility that this duty was
intentionally omitted in order to give exclusive effect to the provision limiting liability for unauthorized acts. Had the court recognized this possibility, it could have reached a similar and more
logical result by utilizing the mass action principle. Under this
theory, the striking members are considered agents of the union
unless the union takes reasonable measures to induce them to return
to work. If such measures are taken, the agency relationship is terminated. Such a theory would also operate directly within sections
301(a) and 301(e) of the L.M.R.A. 31 Because under these sections
authorization and subsequent ratification do not control the determination of the agency relationship, the expansion of the mass action principle would create a workable standard of agency within
the collective bargaining setting. Moreover, it is readily seen that
the mass action principle is particularly applicable to wildcat
strikes. The striking workers are not individuals who, by chance,
choose to protest their grievances simultaneously in a work stoppage. Rather, they are a group banded together to attain their goals
collectively through the strike. Since their only acknowledged
collective bargaining agent is the union, it is entirely reasonable
that the union be compelled to disassociate itself from the strike in
order to negate its agency relationship.3 4 Thus, this proposed
theory-expansion of the mass action principle to a workable standard of agency-would produce the same result as that of the instant court and would have greater analytical consistency with existing labor law. Because the persuasiveness of a district court decision lies in the strength of its reasoning, the instant court would
have established a more viable precedent if it had utilized the existent provisions of the L.M.R.A. and the mass action doctrine.
32. 357 F. Supp. 158, 164 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
33. Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 301(a), (e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), (e) (1970).
The reasoning is as follows: (1) a union is responsible for the acts of its agents (§ 301(b));
(2) authorization on the part of the union is not controlling as to agency (§ 301(e)); (3)
agency, and therefore union liability, can be found unless the union takes all reasonable
means to stop the strike (§ 301(a)).
34. But see Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 672, 700-02 (1967).
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Securities Regulation-Inside InformationTippees Accountable at Common Law to
Corporation for Profits Gained by Use of Inside
Information
Plaintiffs, corporate stockholders of Lum's, Inc.,1 brought a derivative action against an investment firm, 2 its stockbroker, 3 and
two mutual funds,' claiming profits that defendant mutual funds
had realized upon their timely sale of stock in the corporation before
the stock declined in price. Defendants had made the sale after
receiving confidential information in the form of a "tip"5 by the
corporation's president.6 Although the corporation suffered no alleged specific damages from the sale,7 plaintiffs contended that defendant's use of confidential information received while engaged in
a common enterprise with an insider violated a state common law
fiduciary duty' owed to the corporation. Defendants did not deny
that they had been engaged in a joint enterprise with the corporation's president to misuse corporate property, but they argued that
1. Plaintiffs were stockholders in Lum's, Inc., a Florida corporation primarily engaged
in restaurant franchising.
2. Defendant Lehman Brothers is a partnership engaged in stock brokerage and investment counseling.
3. Defendant Simon was employed in Chicago by Lehman Brothers.
4. Defendants Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc. and IDS New Dimensions Fund,
Inc. are mutual funds whose stock portfolios are managed by employees of Investors Diversified Services, Inc., a Minnesota corporation licensed to do business in New York, which had
been joined originally as a defendant at the trial court level. Plaintiffs also had joined as
defendants Chasen, Lum's president, and Sit and Jundt, the managers of the 2 mutual funds.
These individual defendants were dismissed by the trial court because of invalid service of
process under the New York State Long Arm Statute. Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp.
329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5. When corporate insiders-officers, directors, and persons holding substantial proportions of shares-improperly disclose confidential information to outsiders, they are "tipping."
The recipients are "tippees." See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6. In November 1969, Chasen publicly announced prospective fiscal year earnings of
approximately $1.00 per share. When he learned in January, 1970, that earnings would be
only $0.76 per share, he telephoned the news, prior to its public disclosure, to defendant
Simon, who then relayed it to defendant mutual funds' managers. Knowing that the information was confidential corporate property, defendant mutual funds avoided a loss by selling
83,000 shares of Lum's at $17.50 per share, only 4 hours before public disclosure of the
earnings decline. Three days later, when trading in Lum's resumed, the stock closed at $14.00
per share.
7. The complaint contained a general allegation of damages.
8. See 1970 Wis. L. Rav. 576, 579-83 (duty not to use inside information for personal
gain). See generally Conant, Duties of Disclosureof CorporateInsidersWho PurchaseShares,
46 CoRNaLL L.Q. 53 (1961).
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because they were not insiders9 they had breached no fiduciary
duty. The federal district court 0 accepted defendants' assertion"
and dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action.' 2 On
appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed. Tippees who are not corporate officers or directors are nevertheless
accountable at common law to the corporation for profits realized
by the use of inside information received from a corporate official.
Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 42 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1973) (No.
439).
There has been no previous recognition at common law of any
duty on the part of tippees to account to stockholders for profits
made through the use of inside information.' 3 On the ground that
nondisclosure breached a fiduciary duty owed to the owners of the
corporation,' 4 a few cases representing a minority common law view
have held insiders liable to stockholders when the former purchased
stock directly from the stockholders without divulging information
affecting stock prices. In Oliver v. Oliver,'5 the Georgia Supreme
Court characterized confidential information as a corporate asset' 6
and held that the fiduciary duty to shareholders includes holding
this asset in trust for their benefit. Reasoning that insiders must
forego personal benefit from this asset, the court rescinded a director's purchase of stock from his corporation's stockholders when
9. On appeal, defendants Lehman Brothers and Simon further argued that they should
not be held liable for the profits made by the mutual funds because they had not profited
personally.
10. Plaintiffs invoked the diversity jurisdiction of the court.
11. Since Lum's was incorporated in Florida, the district court reasoned that Florida
had the strongest interest in settling the suit. It therefore applied Florida law, which recognizes no duty under these facts. Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 332-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

13.

Cf. 3 L. Loss,

SEURrIEs REGULATMON

1450-51 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, Securities

Fraud: Caveat Tippee-The Creation and Development of a Doctrine, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv.
79, 81 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916) (director is trustee
for stockholders); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916)
(withholding knowledge that stock was worth much more than book value). See also Conant,
supra note 8,at 59-60. The majority view, which did not even recognize this duty, was based
on reasoning that insiders are not dealing with the corpora of their trusts when purchasing
shares from shareholders, that corporations have no interest in outstanding shares, and that
mere superior knowledge or insider-stockholder relations are not enough to raise fiduciary
relationships. Id. at 54-58.
15. 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
16. For a discussion of the relationship between insiders' fiduciary duties and their use
of corporate assets see 1970 Wis. L. REv. 576.
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inside information had indicated to the director that the stock price
was likely to rise.' 7 A few state courts followed Oliver,5 and the
Supreme Court adopted a similar rule, 9 but these cases laid no basis
for imposing parallel fiduciary duties on tippees; none developed the
Oliver implication that misuse of inside information is per se a
breach of fiduciary duty.20 Moreover, they even failed to create effective remedies against insiders' abuses of undisclosed knowledge, and
because no cases extended insiders' fiduciary duties to the corporate
entity, shareholders could sue derivatively 21 only when the corporation was harmed by the insiders.2 Thus, insiders could use confidential information for their personal benefit if they bought or sold
securities as individuals. Such transactions not only created unfair
securities markets but also allowed insiders to escape accounting to
shareholders for misuse of confidential information. 23 In an attempt
to remedy these problems, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 which not only protects stockholders in securities trading but also has been held to reach tippees in certain
instances. 26 Section 16(b) of the Act makes insiders' short-swing
17. Only the director knew of a pending profitable sale of the company's oil plant. Stock
prices jumped from $100 before the sale to $185 afterwards. See Conant, supra note 8, at 59.
18. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) (director who
bought stockholder's shares without divulging pending dividend violated fiduciary duty).
19. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (special facts create fiduciary duty;
director owned 14 of stock, had broad powers to administer company, and alone negotiated
profitable sale of assets).
20. Cf. Comment, A Comparisonof InsiderLiability Under Diamondv. Oreamuno and
FederalSecurities Low, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 499, 502-04 (1970). Most of these cases
were based on common-law active fraud perpetrated on the shareholders as individuals, and
elements of the common-law action carried over to securities trading regulation. See List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (elements of
reliance and materiality required; individual must have acted on misrepresentation a reasonable man would have followed); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353
F. Supp. 264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (misrepresentation, materiality, scienter, privity, reliance,
and causation required); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrriEs RGULnTION 1430-48 (2d ed. 1961); The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120,
1123-26 (1950). Thus, shareholders had difficulty in proving common law fraud. 45 NOME
DAME LAw. 314, 315 (1970).
21. Conant, supra note 8, at 64.
22. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 20, at 502-03. New York courts allowed derivative
actions against directors only when the latter usurped corporate opportunities, competed with
the corporation, mismanaged assets, or otherwise directly injured the corporation. Id.
23. See, e.g., Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922) (no fiduciary relation
or duty of disclosure); Conant, supra note 8, at 64; 45 NoTRE DAME LAw. 314 (1970).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
2.5. The purpose of the Act is to insure honest securities markets by giving all investors
equal access to information and preventing unfair advantage from inside information. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
26. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

1340

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

profits from trading in the company's stock payable to the corporation; 21 section 10(b) 28 and ensuing Securities Exchange Commission
Rule 10b-525 forbid any person to defraud any other person through
the use of inside information in securities trading. Explicit statutory
limitations on the reach of section 16(b) have precluded its application by shareholders to recover profits from tippees, ° but federal
courts and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), in certain
factual situations, have extended liability under Rule 10b-5 to outsiders who collaborate in deceitful use of confidential information."
27. Section 16(b), entitled "Directors, officers, and principal stockholders," provides in
pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [a] beneficial owner [of more than 10 per cent of the corporation's stock],
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase ana sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer . . . within any period of less than six months. . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . . Suit to recover such profit may be instituted. . . by the owner
of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
28. Id. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
29. Entitled "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices," the Rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
30. To its drafters, § 16(b) was simply an application of a settled agency principle: an
agent who profits from information concerning the affairs of his principal owes those profits
to the principal. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934); see 2 L. Loss, SECUarrnES REGULATION
1123 (2d ed. 1961). Nevertheless, it applies not to tippees, but only to traditional insiders-directors, officers, and principal stockholders-who complete their sale or purchase
transaction within 6 months. Thus, it has not pre-empted a common-law remedy based on
insiders' fiduciary duties. Conant, supra note 8, at 68-69; Comment, supra note 20, at 50710; 45 NOrTRE DAME LAw. 314, 316 (1970). These limitations have been strictly followed. See,
e.g., Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (vice president's purchase and sale 3
months after resignation not within § 16(b)); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952)
(alleged tippees, partners of corporate director, not within § 16(b)).
31. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (rule
applies to anyone taking advantage of inside information; employee held liable as tipper for
violation); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dicta: tippees subject to
same duty as insiders); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (broker-dealer, when
informed by director of corporation of dividend cut, liable for selling short on stock of corporation before news made public); 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 985 (1972) (focuses on development of
tippee liability).
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Investors Management Co. 32 imputed insiders' duties to tippees who
had reason to know that material,3 nonpublic information received
by them was divulged improperly by a corporate source. Censuring
the tippees, the SEC ruled that sales prompted by the information
violated Rule 10b-5.14 Despite this broad application of the Rule,
shareholders have not been able to recover tainted profits when
neither they nor the corporation suffer harm by purchasing from or
selling to possessors of inside information.15 Courts therefore have
been forced to turn to common law theories when neither section
16(b) nor Rule 10b-5 applies. In Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 an
employee profited from knowing that his corporate employer secretly intended to force the price of its stock up by purchasing large
blocks of shares. Requiring no harm to the corporation, the Delaware court held that the employee must account to the shareholders
as a constructive trustee of the profits and stated that acquisition
of the information clothed him with a fiduciary duty not to misuse
it.'1 Brophy only implied that it was an agency relationship that
32. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 77,832, at 83,939-40 (SEC
1970).
33. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. solidified the requirement that the information be
material; i.e., if a reasonable man would give it importance in deciding whether to buy or
sell securities, the holder of the information must disclose it or abstain from dealing in it.
401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. Pursuant to the case, the SEC ruled that tippee liability depended on 3 elements:
"that the information in question be material and non-public; that the tippee, whether he
receives the information directly or indirectly, know or have reason to know that it was nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise; and that the
information be a factor in his decision to effect the transaction." Thus, one gains a relationship and ensuing duty to the corporation simply by receiving inside information about whose
disclosure he should be on guard. Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,163, at 80,51920 (1971).
35. Under Rule 10b-5, the fraud must be "in connection with a purchase or sale." See
note 29 supra. Relying on this language, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. held that Rule
10b-5 had "no relation to breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders resulting in fraud
upon those who were not purchasers or sellers." 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). Subsequent cases, however, have weakened this rule. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (shareholders allowed to sue under
Rule 10b-5 when fraud only "touched" a purchase or sale). See generally Lowenfels, The
Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
Nevertheless, courts continue to require some connection. See Feldman v. Hanley, BNA 200
SEC. REG. & L. RP. A-13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1973) (shareholder status alone does not confer
standing to recover loss when induced to hold shares by fraudulent financial statements).
36. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
37. Id. at 246, 70 A.2d at 8. Section 16(b) did not apply to Brophy because the employee
was not a traditional insider; Rule 10b-5 probably did not apply because, although the
corporation planned to buy stock, it did not buy from him.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1342

[Vol. 26

created the duty not to profit from inside information," but in
Diamond v. Oreamuno,39the New York Court of Appeals held corporate officers and directors accountable for profits on express agency
theory. In Diamond, officers and directors of a corporation learned
through inside information that net earnings had declined significantly for the year and sold their stock before the information was
made public. The New York court held that officers and directors
are agents of their corporations and thus hold property of the corporate principal in trust for its benefit. Since inside information is
corporate property, insiders must therefore eschew both personal
benefit and harm to the corporation from its use.4 0 Inferring that
improper disclosure could damage the reputation and the market
for securities of the corporation,' the court concluded that insiders
who misused the .information were constructive trustees of their
profits for the shareholders.2 Agency law also imposes a status of
constructive trustee on persons who intentionally aid an agent in
violating his duty to his principal.4 3 A few courts have developed a
parallel theory, based on common law fiduciary duties, that liability
will extend to all participants in a common enterprise that violates
38. By reasoning that the employee had a position of trust and confidence toward his
employer's business, the court put him in the same position as an agent. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§ 388, comment c at 205 (1958).

39. 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910,
301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
40. Comment c to § 388, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, provides:
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment or in
violation of his duties has a duty not to use it to the disadvantage of the principal ....
He also has a duty to account for any profits made by the use of such information,
although this does not harm the principal. . . . So, if he has 'inside' information that
the corporation is about to purchase or sell securities, or to declare or to pass a dividend,
profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held
in constructive trust for the principal.
41. The court reasoned that revelation of improper conduct clouded the image of probity in management, therefore undermining the public confidence in its securities and injuring
shareholder relations. 24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
42. Section 16(b) did not apply to Diamond defendants because they had not bought
and sold within 6 months; Rule 10b-5 did not apply because neither plaintiffs nor the corporation purchased any stock. Moreover, tippee liability was not at issue in the case, and the court
dismissed directors not directly implicated. 29 App. Div. 2d at 286 & n.1, 290, 287 N.Y.S.2d
at 301-02 & n.1, 305.
43. "A person who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or assists an
agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability to the principal." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958). A comment to this section states: "A person who, with
notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal, receives confidential
information from the agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it and required to hold profits
received by its use as a constructive trustee." Id., comment c at 51-52.
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one participant's fiduciary duties. 4 Combining these agency principles with the Diamond reasoning seems to produce a workable
theory upon which shareholders could recover profits from tippees;
nevertheless, since both Diamond and Brophy defendants had close
relationships to the corporations whose securities were being traded,
no court previous to the instant case had taken that extra step.45
Noting that plaintiffs probably could not prevail under federal
securities law,4" the instant court, because it was sitting in diversity
jurisdiction, looked to the applicable state law of Florida. 7 Finding
that the Florida Supreme Court never had faced the precise issues
present in this action, the court found it proper to look to the law
of other jurisdictions and particularly to that of New York. Recognizing that the New York Diamond case was relevant to the issue
in the instant case, the court stated its further objective of interpreting Diamond as the Florida court probably would. First, the majority reasoned that nothing in Diamond suggests that defendants in
the instant case did not have the same liabilities as the president
of Lum's, because as long as an insider is engaged with outsiders in
a common enterprise to disclose information, revelation of such insider participation tarnishes the prestige and good will of the corporation,' even though the information-prompted stock sales are
made by tippees rather than by the insider; thus, defendants aided
an agent in violating his duty to his corporate principal. Secondly,
the majority asserted that upon receiving the tip, defendants automatically assumed a position of trust for the corporation and held
their profits as constructive trustees. Buttressing legal authority
with policies of securities regulation, the court pointed out reasons
for extension of the Diamond holding to tippees. First, it determined
that outsider liability would discourage insiders from evading the
44. See, e.g., Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744,
749 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("[One who knowingly participates in or joins in an enterprise whereby
a violation of a fiduciary obligation is effected is liable jointly and severally with the recreant
fiduciary."); accord, Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 1006, 1013 (8th Cir. 1964);
Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 807-12, 113 So. 419, 420-21 (1927) (broad fiduciary relation that
embraces both technical fiduciaries and informal relations concerning trust).
45. Cf. 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 985, 991 (1972).
46. Section 16(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not apply because defendants were not traditional
insiders and neither plaintiffs nor the corporation had made the requisite purchase or sale.
See notes 30 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
47. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. Even though both Brophy and Diamond stated that harm need not be alleged in
these suits, the instant court accepted the Diamondtheory of inferred harm. Moreover, it held
that denials of personal benefit by some shareholders were irrelevant because they had joined
the common enterprise. See note 9 supra.
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Diamond rule and preserving unfair advantages by giving information to outsider traders. Secondly, the court noted that although
tippees have been liable under parallel federal securities statutes
designed to prevent unfair trading advantages, judicial construction
of these statutes leaves tippees who misuse confidential information
with an escape from liability in certain instances, unless common
law corporate fiduciary duties are applied. 49 Thirdly, the court decided that plaintiffs, suing on behalf of their corporation, had a
higher claim in equity to the profits than did defendants. The court
noted finally that the Diamond court could have insulated tippees
against their collaborators' fiduciary duties, but failed to do so.5
Therefore, it concluded that defendants must turn over their profits
to the corporation. Although agreeing with the objective of honesty
in securities markets, Judge Kaufman dissented9" vigorously against
tippee liability as a means to achieve the objective in the instant
case. The dissent argued that Diamond, which imposed liability
only on directors and officers, is inapplicable because there is no
relation in the instant case between defendants and the corporation;5 2 moreover, he found that neither agency law nor a common
enterprise theory extended liability to defendants because they did
not actively or intentionally help the president violate his duty not
to misuse the information.13 Finally, in noting ample remedies under
federal securities statutes to punish conduct like that in the present
case, 54 the dissent suggested that federal, not state, courts have
expanded tippee liability and that the instant court should be
applying Florida law. 5
By deterring corporate insiders' collaboration with tippees to
misuse confidential information, the synthesis provided in the present case not only reaches conduct beyond the purview of the federal
49. See material cited notes 30 & 35 supra.
50. The court not only overruled the district court's dismissal of defendants who only
"acquiesced" in the wrong but also distinguished a similar action in Diamond because the
dismissed defendants there were not actively engaged in a joint venture. 478 F.2d 817, 822
n.6 (1973).
51. Id. at 825 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
52. Since no specific damages were suffered, Judge Kaufman claimed that the court
should have required a relationship between defendants and the corporation.
53. See note 43 supra. Judge Kaufman, who considered the distinction between acquiescence and active aid in violation of fiduciary duties controlling, found that defendants
were not active participants since they had not planned to misuse or solicited the information.
478 F.2d 817, 827 n.3.
54. But see note 46 supra.
55. Unlike the majority, Judge Kaufman would look only to Florida decisions, which
had no correlate to Diamond. 478 F.2d at 828.
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securities laws but also furthers those laws' purposes of protecting
investors and insuring a fair securities market. 5 It also accords with
the trend in federal cases toward liability of tippees, some of whom
may affect the market more than traditional insiders by virtue of
having more money and investment sophistication. 7 Moreover, the
instant ruling was necessary; the cases suggest that Rule 10b-5 may
never be extended to situations like the present one because there
is still a requirement in suits for damages that the plaintiff or the
corporation on whose behalf he is suing s be a purchaser or seller.
In comparison, the present common law theory accords with a settled agency rule that can be applied effectively. 9 Unfortunately,
however, the instant case inadequately defined the breadth of that
theory. First, Diamond, on which the court placed heavy reliance,
can easily be distinguished-it involved no tippees. Thus the instant court is probably going much farther in extending tippee liability than would most courts that looked to Diamond as a precedent for such an extension. In the future, courts may therefore refuse
to follow the instant case. Secondly, the court left unanswered questions of multiple liability. If either stockholders or the corporation
has purchased or sold securities in connection with fraudulent misconduct, and if the instant case as well as Rule 10b-5 applies, tippees could face double counts of misconduct." Even if stockholders
do not purchase any securities from dishonest tippees, they may sue
under the common law theory, while identifiable purchasers sue
under Rule 10b-5.11 Moreover, when either the stockholders or the
corporation has purchased, recovery from tippees is available under
both Rule 10b-5 and the Schein theory, 2 despite the 1934 Act's
56. See 45 NYrRE DAME LAw. 314, 316-17 (1970).
57. Cf. 119 U. PA. L. REv. 502, 508-10 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, rev'd on rehearingen banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (plaintiff sued derivatively on behalf
of the corporation, which was a purchaser). See also note 35 supra.
59. See note 43 supra. The dissent's statement that the agency rule is inapplicable
because defendants were not actively involved lacks merit; they did not deny active participation.
60. See notes 61-62 infra and accompanying text.
61. 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 314, 322-23 (1970). For the applicable rules, see notes 29 & 43
.supra. Although the instant court reasoned that defendants could escape multiple liability
by having any state court judgment amount paid into court escrow subject to claims of actual
defrauded purchasers, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971),
there is no reason to assume that this would preclude the purchasers from suing in federal
court on a different claim.
62. Although Rule 10b-5 does not provide standing for private shareholders to sue under
it, courts have consistently allowed them to do so. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v.
Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); 45 NoTRE DAME LAW. 314, 317 (1970). But see
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efforts to limit recovery to no more than actual damages. 3 If the
primary purpose of the remedies is to reimburse investors, these
multiple remedies may be desirable; if it is primarily to insure fair
markets, one punishment of the dishonest party may be enough.
This priority should be determined. Thirdly, the uncertainty of
multiple recovery is matched by uncertainty as to who may now be
a liable tippee. The court did not explicitly distinguish between the
casual tippee and the institutional investor whose primary job is to
gather investment information and whose fear of liability could
hinder its function, thus damaging the securities market more than
the use of inside information." The facts in the present case clearly
would encompass institutional investors and would not exemplify
casual slips that divulge information, but the court could have
added certainty by specifying as much. The instant court was not
examining cases under the federal securities statutes; 5 however, it
might have clarified the decision's breadth by applying the criteria
for tippee liability pronounced in Investors Management." These
criteria are well-defined and reasonably suited to common law
theory. Instead, the court relied heavily on the common enterprise
theory in order to find a relationship between defendants and the
corporation and noted no definite tests of that theory's applicability. 7 The illustration of a potent agency theory in Diamond and the
reasoning of the courts in Oliver, Brophy, and Investors-that receiving the information while knowing of impropriety is more important in attributing fiduciary duties to the recipients than the relationship that gives them access to the information-suggest a less
strained and more definite test of common law tippee liability. Such
Comment, supra note 20, at 511-12 (proper plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5 are purchasers, because the purpose of the Rule is to prevent general fraud in the securities market).
63. Section 28 of the 1934 Act provides:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted to
maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover. . . a total
amount in excess of his actual damages . . . . Nothing in this chapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of. . . any State . . . insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). The clause saving all other
remedies has been viewed as allowing double recovery in spite of the damages limitation. 45

NOTRE

DAME LAW.

314, 332 (1970).

64. 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 502, 508-10 (1971).
65. Since the court was sitting in diversity jurisdiction and applying state law, it did
not examine Investors and similar cases.
66. See note 34 supra.
67. See cases cited note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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a test would be whether, after having met the Investors criteria, one
can be said to have (1) personally benefited from intentionally
assisting an insider in violating his duty as an agent to the corporation and (2) converted a corporate asset, the confidential information. This test would likely apply to the present defendants, and
hopefully it would be specific enough to prevent an overly broad
interpretation of the instant ruling. It is noteworthy that in a bill
presented to Parliament, the Department of Trade and Industry of
Great Britain has aimed at prohibiting misuse of inside information
not only by restricting trading of directors, employees, major shareholders, professional advisers, and the near relations of each, but
also by defining insider dealing broadly enough to imply that tippees could be included." This implication, the inclusion of employees, advisers, and their relations in the bill, and the potential overbreadth of decisions such as the instant case that attempt to fill
gaps in our own securities laws, all point to the need for revision of
Rule 10b-5 or amendment of section 16(b) to place liability on others
than traditional insiders. An amendment could contain concrete
criteria that clearly determine the extent of the prohibition on misuse of inside information. For example, section 16(b) might be
amended to allow shareholders to recover profits from institutional
investors who complete a purchase-sale or sale-purchase transaction
within six months of receiving material, confidential information
whose disclosure they knew was improper. 9 The possible overbreadth of the present case and the British attempt at securities
regulation indicate that changes in federal securities law would be
a more prudent solution than attempts to develop a lasting common
law theory based on the instant precedent.
68. It is important to avoid an unfairly onerous restriction on normal transactions
by people who have no direct relationship with the company or its officers. The definition
[of insider] should, in the Government's view, include directors, employees, major
shareholders and professional advisers of a company, together with the near relations of
each of these people. Secondly, there is the question whether an offence is committed
by an insider only when he deals with the guilty intent of profiting from inside information, or simply when he deals having price-sensitive inside information at the same time.
The Government's view is that dealing in a company's securities by anyone who, by
reason of his relationship with the company or with its officers, has information which
he know to be price-sensitive, should be a criminal offence unless he can show that his
primary intention . . . was not to make a profit or avoid a loss.
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAw REFORM BiLL, CMND. No. 5391, at 9 (1973).
69. Early drafts of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would have applied to tippees
as well as insiders, but final enactment excluded these provisions. Rattner v. Lehman, 193
F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).

